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Introduction 
 
In an age of cross-border migration, the definition of membership in bounded states is des-
tined to come under close scrutiny. The range of policies and of legal definitions and re-
definitions must be considered against a backdrop of diverse developments. In many coun-
tries, changing rules of citizenship have allowed for easier access for immigrants; at the 
same time, access to participation in nearly all sectors of society has been eased for immi-
grants (Kivisto and Faist, 2007), and the number of states tolerating dual citizenship has 
grown (Faist, 2007). Scholars and political and social actors are less and less engaged in the 
major debates, common in the 1980s and 1990s, over ethno-national understandings of na-
tionhood (ius sanguinis: blood principle, parental lineage) and legal-rational understandings 
of political membership (ius soli: territorial principle, birthright; ius domicilii: residence princi-
ple, permanent abode) (Brubaker, 1992; based on Meinecke, 1908). Indeed, ‘we all are re-
publican now’ (Faist, 2007). In place of these debates we find that access to citizenship is 
increasingly a matter of immigrants’ individual skills, and their political and social competen-
cies—or their willingness to learn them—necessary to integrate in a political community. The 
larger concerns of collective reciprocity, solidarity and trust seem to be absent from the pro-
cess, which is evident in the increasing emphasis on human capital in the admission of mi-
grants.  
While overall these processes have moved in an inclusionary direction, exclusionary tenden-
cies can be discerned in civil society. This apparent contradiction raises questions about the 
relationship between state membership and social or community membership, how the two 
interact, and how this interaction has evolved. Such exclusionary tendencies, which can be 
seen in most countries, range from religious identification in Europe to linguistic issues in the 
US (cf. Zolberg & Woon, 1999). There are differences, however, in the ways in which such 
heterogeneities are dealt with institutionally.  One distinguishing feature of religious inclusion, 
for example, is the extent to which religious organizations are recognized: for example, the 
corporatist German system sets high hurdles for access of Muslim organizations in public 
policy, whereas the British system does not require such elaborate institutional inclusion. 
Another mark of difference in state approaches is the degree to which the rights of citizens 
are extended beyond civil, political and social rights (Marshall, 1964) to include cultural rights 
of national minorities (Kymlicka, 1995). Even though ‘multiculturalism’ has been all but re-
 3 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
jected by most major European countries, cultural rights continue to be debated vigorously 
and cause conflicts in civil society. In sum, there has been a ‘rights revolution’ underway 
since the 1960s which is being expressed in changing citizenship legislation—increased tol-
erance of some form of dual citizenship in almost half of the world’s states, and a shifting 
view wherein membership based on descent (ius sanguinis) has been complemented by 
birth in the immigration country (ius soli). In turn, this Increasing liberalization of access to 
citizenship for migrants in western democracies can be seen as part of a broader shift from 
‘ethnic’ to ‘civic’ nationalism.  
Still, there is a discernible illiberal counter-trend which manifests itself in two ways: 1) mi-
grants who contribute actively to economic productivity, especially the highly skilled (Faist, 
2013), are prioritized; and 2) ‘undesirable’ migrants are devalued and culturalized as the oth-
er (Triadafilopoulos, 2011). We alsonote the increasing significance of ‘securitization’ in mi-
gration control and in civic life more generally, increased references to the fiscal, financial 
and economic crisis with respect to inclusion, and the penetration of economic criteria into 
the discourse of citizenship policy. To paraphrase Aristide Zolberg (1987), those who are 
‘wanted and welcome’ – admitted on the basis of merit—lie at the opposite end of the spec-
trum from those who are ‘wanted but not welcome,’ immigrants who are admitted for eco-
nomic reasons but unwelcome for cultural reasons. This binary focus on the extremes omits 
many other categories in an imagined middle, for example, those categorized legally as asy-
lum seekers or those who immigrate for purposes of family reunification.  
Further evidence of this illiberal counter-trend is abundant. After 2001, many countries raised 
the bar for naturalization by introducing language and citizenship tests, integration courses 
and citizenship ceremonies (Green, 2012), with clear assimilatory intent. One might question 
what obligatory civic integration says about liberal-democratic norms and principles being 
shared by all. Consider, for example, the increasing securitization of citizenship and public 
concern about the compatibility of Muslim immigrants post-9/11. At the other end of the mi-
gration process we see a re-ethnicizing, whereby home country governments promote dual 
citizenship to foster the affiliation of emigrants to their country of origin (Lafleur, 2013). 
Notwithstanding the principles of liberal economies which call for the opening of borders for 
capital, goods, services and people in the economic sphere, the principles of political com-
munities demand some closure against the outside, thus enforcing a logic of inclu-
sion/exclusion of newcomers (Freeman, 1986, Carens 2013). For political communities, 
boundaries serve the function of creating a desired social order and lessening the ubiquitous, 
yet diffuse, threat of violence. Beyond the fundamental Hobbesian idea of social order, the 
production and redistribution of collective goods for purposes of justice, including welfare, 
also require a bounded community. In this formulation, the liberty of those within the state 
can be guaranteed only by the monopolization of power through the nation-state (Tilly, 1990) 
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and the curtailing of the liberty of individuals falling outside the nation-state (Bosniak, 2008). 
In short, citizenship is both internally inclusive and externally exclusive, and it is these oppos-
ing principles which drive the politics and policies of membership. 
 
1 Policy Shift in the Major Immigration Countries  
 
 
In the following we present recent developments in several major migrant-receiving countries 
in Europe: Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France and Italy with an eye on 
the nexus between immigration and citizenship policies. 
Germany. In 2000, Germany took a first step to end the complete ban on foreign labour re-
cruitment, established in 1973, by introducing the immediate-action program to cover the IT-
skilled worker gap (German Green Card) which offered IT-personnel a five year residence 
and work permit in Germany (Westerhoff, 2007). This programme was followed in 2005 by 
the New Foreigner Law that, inter alia, institutionalized the privileged entrance of profession-
als and also included newly established integration policies, particularly voluntary and in 
some cases compulsory citizenship and language classes. In parallel, Germany took a major 
departure from its historically restrictive citizenship access policies by introducing the ius soli 
principle alongside ius sanguinis in 2000, making it possible to acquire German citizenship 
by virtue of birth on German soil, provided one parent had a permanent residence permit. 
Germany also allowed several exceptions to the policy of rejecting dual citizenship, although 
it still does not tolerate dual citizenship as a rule, except for other EU member states with 
which reciprocity agreements apply. Requirements for citizenship acquisition were also light-
ened, and the general attitude toward naturalization, traditionally considered the most im-
portant result of immigration, was revised. The length of the residence period to qualify for 
naturalization was reduced almost by half, from 15 to eight years. In 2008 it was reduced 
further, to seven years, for applicants completing integration courses containing a language 
test (better language skills reduce residence requirements even further, to six years) and a 
naturalization test to demonstrate knowledge of German society. Even though the civic inte-
gration courses and tests would be considered a form of restrictive barrier, they are never-
theless well within ‘the ambit of liberalism’ (Joppke, 2010: 68), as they relate to the individual 
level, implying they can be met by every individual. Still, given the language requirement, the 
courses and tests are no doubt used as ‘an instrument for the selection of (more highly) 
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skilled migrants’ (Michalowski, 2010: 191). There are signs that the public discourse, cen-
tered for a long time between the dichotomy of the need to create a “welcome culture” for 
high-skilled, but also for humanitarian migrants, and the fear of “poverty migration” and the 
loss of the German Leitkultur (Aksakal and Schmidt-Verkerk, 2014), is shifting towards a 
concern about the integration, particularly of successful asylum applicants, into different 
spheres of the German society. 
 
 United Kingdom. In contrast to Germany, the UK has understood itself as a long-term im-
migration country and often defines itself as a multicultural nation, based on its colonial histo-
ry and Commonwealth system. Yet since EU enlargement, and especially its eastward ex-
pansion, worries about immigration have ballooned. These worries take the form of the oft-
repeated narrative about an impending economic decline caused by immigrants taking up 
jobs that should be given to British citizens and about immigrants’ perceived abuse of the 
welfare system. A climate of exclusion has been created, with the majority of British citizens 
opposing migration, believing too many migrants enter the UK, and perceiving migration as a 
problem rather than an opportunity. Public opinion is slightly friendlier when it comes to im-
migrants with skills required for the functioning of society, such as doctors or nurses (Blinder, 
2012).  
Government policies and state discourse have played no small role in contributing to the per-
ception of migrants, especially refugees and asylum seekers, as a threat to be averted by 
strict border protection and to a demand for measures preventing migrants from overstaying 
their visas or remaining in the country for purposes other than what is stated in their visas 
(Mulvey, 2010). A recent analysis of the development of highly-skilled migration to the UK 
between 2007 and 2013 shows that also the number of highly-skilled recent migrant workers 
(RMW ) has significantly decreased in this time frame, particularly from non EU-countries 
(Rienzo and Vargas-Silva, 2014). One important reason for this trend is the introduction of 
the Points Based System (PBS) in 2008. Before the system came into force, high-skilled mi-
grants could enter the UK either through the Work Permit System (WPS), requiring a job of-
fer, or through the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP) searching for work or becom-
ing self-employed (Zuccotti, 2013). 
In line with the stricter immigration policies the British Government defines British citizenship 
as ‘a privilege and not a right,’ and calls for advanced language skills and knowledge about 
British culture (UK Government, 2013). In theory, ‘citizenship is more esteemed and valued if 
it is earned, not given’ (Crick Commission, 2003: 3). The selection criteria for becoming a UK 
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citizen by naturalization became more rigid in October 2013. Along with some vague charac-
teristics (‘good character’ and ‘sound of mind’), applicants must be 18 years of age or older, 
willing to live in the UK and pass a test proving knowledge of the English language and life in 
the UK (UK Government, 2014).  
 
 
The Netherlands. At one time, in the 1960s and 1970s, immigration was regarded by the 
Dutch government as a temporary phenomenon: those arriving from Morocco and Turkey, 
mainly guest workers and their families, were expected at some point to return home. In 
1980, a sea change occurred in policies on naturalization and integration of migrants, leading 
to the creation of the ‘Minorities Policy’ which was based on the recognition that immigration 
could often turn out to be a lasting condition and ‘immigrant integration would be assisted by 
a secure residence status, equal rights, family reunification and full participation in education 
and the labour market’ (OECD, 2011:336). In this paradigm shift, the Netherlands defined 
itself as tolerant and multicultural. Over the last 15 years, however, attitudes changed and 
this very liberal Dutch approach to immigration and citizenship (compared to other European 
countries) has been replaced by a narrow and restrictive one (Vasta, 2006). Among Dutch 
citizens holding populist views, the fear was that the laissez-faire attitude was endangering 
‘native Dutch’ values and it was thought that many citizens were unwilling or unable to inte-
grate. The 2002 murder of the anti-immigrant party leader Pim Fortuyn and the 2004 murder 
of filmmaker Theo van Gogh, known for his Islamophobic statements, escalated anti-
immigrant sentiment among the self-defined ‘autochthonous’ parts of the Dutch population.  
As elsewhere, these developments were mirrored at the policy level. The conservative gov-
ernment, elected in 2002, introduced the requirement of an immigration (culture and lan-
guage) test to qualify for a visa. Unlike the integration courses offered since 1998, organized 
and financed by the Dutch government, the new test is offered by private institutes and paid 
for by the immigrants. Immigrants who fail the test or do not pass it in time are faced with 
fines and residence status sanctions (OECD, 2011). Prior policies promoting ‘naturalization 
as a right’ for children of immigrants born in the Netherlands and the right to obtain dual na-
tionality, established in 1984, resulted in a peak of applications for citizenship in 1996. In 
response, in the context of a more critical policy and public debate on immigration, this right 
was revoked by the introduction of a naturalization test in 2003 framing Dutch citizenship as 
‘something to be proud of, not a consumption article’ (OECD, 2011: 340).  
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France. The republican principle underpins approaches to nationality in the French case, 
with nationality intricately connected to a confirmation of political values (Nicholls, 2012). 
From 1899 until 1993 the double ius soli principle of citizenship acquisition was in effect. That 
principle ensured the third generation (both parents born in the country) was automatically 
naturalized, while the second generation (at least one immigrant parent) was naturalized 
upon reaching maturity. French republicanism is related to a version of laicism, which can be 
seen in such cases, for example, as the outlawing of headscarves in schools, in 2004. In 
another case, in 2008, the highest court (Conseil d’État) denied a burka-wearing woman 
French citizenship because of ‘insufficient assimilation,’ a clear reflection of the fear of the 
destruction of republican ideology (Lefebvre, 2010). In another policy move, under Interior 
Minister Nicolas Sarkozy in 2003, a compulsory integration course was introduced, empha-
sizing language training and knowledge about institutions and values of the French republic. 
It was assumed that completion of this compulsory course meant establishing a ‘relationship 
of trust and mutual obligation’ between the individual and the state. The government has 
since gone a step further in passing the law of immigration and integration, making civic inte-
gration courses obligatory to obtain a one-year, renewable resident permit. After two years, 
immigrants can apply for a ten-year permanent residence card. As former president Sarkozy 
put it, the law facilitates a fundamental change in immigration policies from the ‘unwanted’ 
(subie) to the ‘chosen’ (choisie).  
 
Italy. Since the end of the recruitment of Italian workers by Northern European countries in 
the early 1970s, Italy has experienced a shift from mainly being an emigration country to be-
ing one of the most important immigration countries in Europe (Paparusso et al., 2016, Tin-
tori, 2013). This trend has been reinforced during the current humanitarian crisis, as a con-
sequence of which in 2015 almost 154,000 refugees and asylum seekers from various coun-
tries arrived at Italian shores (UNHCR, 2016).  
While immigrants are thus becoming an increasingly important part of Italian society in terms 
of numbers, and although the government has started to recognize the potential benefits of 
immigrants for the Italian economy and for the labor market, they are still considered un-
wanted and not welcome in society, which is expressed through the strict immigration and 
deportation laws (Paparusso et al., 2016; see also Ambrosini 2013). 
The first groups of migrants arriving in Italy in the 1970s to 1990s consisted particularly of 
Albanians, Moroccans and Tunisians, while migration from Romania and China has recently 
gained importance. This migration history is reflected in the number of naturalizations, of 
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which Moroccans and Albanians occupy the highest share. The acquisition of Italian citizen-
ship was for a long time mainly based on marriage, a trend that changed in 2009 after new 
legislation which held that marriages have to last two years instead of formerly six months 
before the foreign partner could apply for Italian citizenship. At the same time, the number of 
people granted citizenship based on their time of residence in Italy (10 years for non-EU na-
tionals) has significantly increased. Once granted, it allows the unconditional acceptance of 
dual citizenship (Tintori, 2013).  
However, access to Italian citizenship is considered more difficult than in other major immi-
gration countries, due to the strict eligibility criteria. In addition, second-generation migrants 
are not granted citizenship upon birth in the country. These strict immigration and naturaliza-
tion policies may be interpreted as a reflection of the perception of the Italian government of 
migration as a temporary phenomenon and the negligence of the need for integration policies 
and measures (Paparusso et al., 2016). 
 
Other countries. Generally speaking, rich, industrialized and democratic countries welcome 
highly qualified workers, who are thought to possess sufficient financial and human capital to 
move. The new mobile cosmopolitans, mainly highly skilled young urban populations, are 
recognized as a distinct type of migrant: ‘Eurostars’, for example, are young persons who are 
mobile within the European Union (Favell, 2008). Temporary mobility to the EU of high-
skilled professionals from tertiary countries has since 2011 been facilitated through the im-
plementation of the EU Blue Card, which grants its holders the right to work and live in an EU 
member country, provided that certain conditions related to the job and the income are met. 
Unlike many migrants who establish long-term or permanent links to their destination coun-
tries, migrants such as these who come from rich countries are less interested in naturaliza-
tion in other rich countries, and their migration intentions are often temporary and circular. 
Circular or temporary mobility of this nature is easily explained for citizens of EU member 
states: Because migrants working or studying in other EU countries enjoy the same civil and 
social rights as national citizens, their rate of naturalization is understandably low. Moreover, 
for the internationally mobile, highly skilled migrants—those who are wanted and welcome—
there is less of a legal necessity to obtain citizenship of the destination country, since they 
usually do not plan to stay in the destination country for an extended period. For many, citi-
zenship in the host country is neither desirable nor necessary, while for migrants from poor 
countries, acquiring citizenship of rich countries remains important (see Rutter et al., 2008 for 
the UK). A main benefit of immigration country citizenship, and implicitly dual citizenship, is 
the ability to travel with fewer restrictions, such as the need for a visa 
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2 Citizenship beyond the National State 
 
It has been noted empirically that citizenship is becoming increasingly unbundled. Identity, 
political participation rights and social benefits which were once grouped tightly together un-
der the rubric of national citizenship are, in a number of circumstances, today being dis-
aggregated, and re-assembled in new ways. It is not at all uncommon now to see several 
partially overlapping, partially competing, governance structures with diverging membership 
criteria existing within a single territory. An example of this phenomenon can be seen in the 
fact that certain non-citizen residents have voting rights in some municipal elections in Eu-
rope. There is conflicting opinion about this disaggregation: Some see in it a sign that de-
mocracy is ending in the name of transnational capital, labour and consumerism; others sug-
gest that one can also locate in such a disaggregation a site for a pluralist cosmopolitan fed-
eralism of the sort that Immanuel Kant advocated (Benhabib, 2004). 
A fundamental question to consider, given these shifting circumstances and attitudes, is 
whether citizenship can fruitfully be conceptualized beyond the national state or, put another 
way, and as, for example, Bryan Turner argued (1993), whether citizenship can be transna-
tionalized. (There may be some conceptual stretching if the answer is yes.) Yet a third view 
rejects both positions and argues that the unbundling of rights, territories and authorities 
does not lead to a juxtaposition of old, national forms with new, supranational or even global 
forms of citizenship because supranational and global processes mainly work through a re-
configured national state (Sassen, 2006). These arguments notwithstanding, there are two 
identifiable forms of citizenship reaching beyond and below the national state. The first is 
overlapping, best visualized in citizenship as circles which overlap each other—dual or multi-
ple citizenship in national states is a prominent example. The second form is nested, consist-
ing of concentric circles: a person may be a citizen of Lisbon, Portugal and the EU.  
 
Dual Citizenship: In immigration countries dual citizenship is usually legitimated by positing 
that legal equality should be a prerequisite for substantive citizenship, that is, full participation 
in economic, political and cultural life, in the place of residence. Instrumentally, the claim 
hinges on the observation that those states tolerating dual citizenship have proportionally 
more immigrants who have naturalized. These arguments follow upon the understanding of 
citizenship as a human right. First, in international law, this is increasingly the case, to take 
the example of stateless persons (Chan, 1991). Second, the human right to gender equality, 
which became enshrined in international law in the Convention on Nationality for Married 
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Women in 1957, and later found its way into the laws of national states, has implications for 
citizenship equality. According to this body of law, women do not have to cede legal citizen-
ship when marrying a spouse of another nationality. Furthermore, a Convention of the Coun-
cil of Europe (1993) enables children from bi-national marriages to have dual or multiple citi-
zenships. Broadly considered, countries with significant shares of emigrants have adapted 
their citizenship laws in the direction of greater tolerance of dual citizenship among their citi-
zens abroad. It should be noted, however, that in such cases the above-mentioned factors 
have played a less important role than maintaining and re-forging ties to (former) citizens 
abroad (e.g. Górny et al., 2007). Third, normative problems of legitimation arise if immigrants 
with permanent residency are denied access to citizenship in the long run (Walzer, 1986: 31-
63). 
The increasing toleration of dual citizenship is reflective of multiple belonging, whereby inser-
tion in the country of settlement is not necessarily accompanied by dismantling ties to the 
countries of origin. Affiliation to transnationally connected families, religious communities and 
transnational networks of entrepreneurs is, thus, not an anomaly, but one of many pathways 
to incorporation (Faist & Gerdes, 2008). 
Dual citizenship has different implications depending on the structure and design of the re-
spective political systems. Dual citizenship enters the picture, above all, from the acquisition 
of citizenship at birth—from parents with different nationalities or a combination of ius san-
guinis transmission by state of origin and ius soli acquisition in the state of residence. Moreo-
ver, it is increasingly the case that dual nationality through naturalization does not involve 
renouncing previously acquired legal citizenship. While dual citizenship may raise certain 
problems, violation of democratic principles is not one of them, despite that fact that some 
will argue that it violates equality of representation by giving people two votes. Even assum-
ing they can also vote by absentee ballot in the country where they do not reside at the mo-
ment, dual citizens still have one vote only in each election. These separate votes are never 
aggregated in the process of electing representatives or in a referendum. Dual citizens have 
a stake in two different states, but their votes do not count twice in any decision. This is dif-
ferent in federal states, such as the US, or in proto-federal systems, such as the European 
Union (EU). If a resident of both Germany and France were enfranchised in both countries 
for elections to the European Parliament, her vote is counted twice in determining the repre-
sentation of these countries (more precisely, districts of these countries).  
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European citizenship: The divergence between social and political citizenship, which has 
been observed empirically, has led to a wider, far-reaching debate on the nature of contem-
porary citizenship. The debate is rooted in the notion that permanent residents may have 
access to virtually all social rights, yet be barred from the right to vote because they are not 
de jure citizens, that is, citizens in the full legal sense. One branch of the discussion con-
cerns the concept of post-national citizenship, which has direct relevance for the EU and 
national states because it puts the focus on the increasing role of genuinely inter- and supra-
state policies and rights. Post-nationalists claim that human rights have come closer to citi-
zens’ rights; in their view, liberal-democratic states have increasingly come to respect the 
human rights of persons, irrespective of their citizenship (Soysal, 1994). Indeed, states have 
granted rights to certain groups, thereby conferring on them the status not of citizens (yet) 
but of denizens – immigrants holding permanent residence status, including virtually all civil 
and social rights. The practice of conferring denizenship counteracted one of the main trends 
of national state citizenship, which privileged the binary opposition of “citizen” versus “alien,” 
in contrast to the complex relationships between individuals and communities in ancien ré-
gime societies (Fahrmeir, 2007). Denizenship implies that aliens acquire rights that have 
formerly been the prerogative of citizens (Hammar, 1990). These categories of people in-
clude permanent residents in the member states of the EU, that is, citizens of third states 
(extracommunitari) holding the citizenship of a non-EU country. In effect, supra-state institu-
tions such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have developed common rights for all 
residents. For this reason, today there are few differences between denizens and citizens of 
EU member states in the matter of social rights. Nevertheless, writers in the post-national 
vein have little to say about citizens, as the focus is on the divergence between rights and 
identity, not about democracy. They are mainly concerned with the closing rights gap be-
tween denizens and citizens (Jacobson, 1996), and tend to disregard the very foundation of 
citizenship, equal political liberty. 
It is useful to view supranational citizenship within a framework of nested citizenship (Faist, 
2001). The concept of nested membership is a way of understanding the notion that mem-
bership in the EU has multiple sites, and there is an interactive, dynamic system of politics, 
policies, and rights between the sub-state, state, inter-state and supra-state levels. The web 
of governance networks allows for enshrining (currently a few) new rights on the supra-state 
level, interconnecting them with pre-existing ones, and – above all – re-adapting or harmo-
nizing rights and institutions in existing member states. It is unlikely that in the near future the 
EU will become a federal political system like those found in its member states. Thus, while 
we cannot speak of EU citizenship as full-fledged federal citizenship, nevertheless what has 
evolved in the EU is an extraordinarily intricate network of overlapping authorities and at-
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tendant rights. As it stands now, EU (social) citizenship has not made up for what many citi-
zens in member states as national welfare states have lost in the wake of massive economic 
liberalization (Streeck, 2015). 
The specific characteristics of nested citizenship are as follows. First, nested membership 
suggests multiple levels. The political actors − including sovereign member states, the EU 
Commission, the Council of Ministers, lobby groups and citizens’ associations − are involved 
in activities at different levels. 
Second, European Union citizenship is devoid of morally demanding social rights, such as 
those involving re-distribution of funds. Such rights would require support by strong social 
and symbolic ties of generalized reciprocity and diffuse solidarity, ties that are usually limited 
to collectives which are much narrower than the category ‘European people’ as a whole. For 
example, generational reciprocity in pension systems does not reach from Finland to Portu-
gal. Still, this is not to say that the EU has not had an impact on social rights. Take the realm 
of national health services, for example, where EU rules have conditioned the options of na-
tional welfare states. But as it stands, the EU has implemented new rights only in limited are-
as, such as the rights of mobile citizens of EU member states, in the sphere of gender equity 
and regarding health and occupational safety. 
Third, nested citizenship is a form of federative membership, which is distinct from simple 
coexistence of different levels. European Union citizenship as a whole is sited in various 
governance levels, with the result that there can be no smooth evolution or transition of nest-
ed citizenship to a truly federal citizenship. Member-state sovereignty in the matter of grant-
ing citizenship carries far-reaching implications for the slow evolution of a more coherent EU 
citizenship, and the resistance of member states against it. The issue of free movement pro-
vides a number of examples: Argentinians with Spanish or Italian ancestry might have re-
claimed the citizenship of their ancestors and moved to the EU – but not necessarily to their 
country of citizenship in the EU. Hungary has extended citizenship to co-ethnics in Serbia, 
and Moldavians have access to Romanian citizenship, with the result that European Union 
citizenship and its associated mobility right has been conferred at the same time. In all these 
cases member states in the EU other than the ones mentioned could (have) object(ed). Cas-
es like these and others are one of the factors slowing down the unification of citizenship 
within the EU. The ability of member states to regulate admission to state citizenship stands 
in stark contrast to their growing inability to define who is considered a ‘worker’ and thus able 
to cross borders freely and engage in economic activities. It becomes evident that access to 
member-state citizenship is an instrument wielded by the now semi-sovereign states to fend 
off continued encroachment of EU case law upon access to their labour markets. Having lost 
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their sovereignty with respect to the free movement of labour, member states jealously guard 
their exclusive right to naturalization.  
The fourth characteristic of nested citizenship is that it cannot be thought of as membership 
that is guided by a coherent or even centralized centre of political authority. In distinction 
from citizenship in federal political systems, such as the Federal Republic of Germany (not to 
speak of unitary systems), the highest level of nested citizenship (EU) should not be under-
stood as the primary centre of political authority standing above the sub-state systems. The 
multi-tiered governance network of the EU is better understood as a loose proto-federal sys-
tem. 
3 Conclusion  
While there may be widespread tendencies toward re-ethnicization, rules of acquisition for 
citizenship depend less on ethnic criteria. This is not to say that exclusionary tendencies are 
less pronounced. Rather, they have changed shape to focus on economic competitiveness 
and cultural modernity. The imposition of new rules for access to citizenship and more re-
strictive immigration rules, applying not only to labor migrants but also to asylum seekers and 
refugees, is strong evidence for this conclusion. Also, the EU has not compensated for eco-
nomic liberalization it brought about. It has not yet built robust social rights. 
The debate thus focuses less on the ethnic vs. civic distinction in the legal status dimension 
of citizenship and more on the normative realm of the political community, making it im-
portant to take note of the shifting boundaries of the political sphere, which in turn takes us 
far beyond the migration field to touch on the principles of democracy. The liberalization or 
restriction of citizenship and the implications for state-citizen relations are often discussed 
within the context of the withdrawal of the nation-state and the erosion of social rights. The 
loss of a meaningful citizenship is documented by research noting the perpetuation of nega-
tive rights (protection rights against the state) and the decline of positive rights (the state 
must actively provide material and other resources to realize these rights), changes brought 
about by government policies adopting and enforcing a civic and liberal universalistic orienta-
tion. As various authors have observed, the new social project in Europe favors a citizenship 
model that privileges individuals as bearers of human capital and makes a close connection 
between work, economic productivity and social justice (Münch, 2012). The free-floating indi-
vidual in the market sphere is able to enjoy a contract with a nation state only if she contrib-
utes to the community and is not a burden to the social welfare system. By the same token, 
individual migrants are evaluated as bearers of human capital—as is evident by the spread 
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of point systems in European immigration laws to favor young, highly skilled immigrants 
(Boucher & Cerna, 2014). 
In light of these changes in the European social project, it appears that liberal democratic 
states are not per se directing policy or discourse against foreigners but against a specific 
type which seems incompatible with liberal ways of life. Openly discriminatory group-level 
exclusion in the selection of immigrants has given way to an individualistic skills approach, 
along with criteria based on human rights, such as family reunification and asylum. The blur-
ring of racial, ethnic and religious boundaries is enforced by a human rights discourse that 
stigmatizes group-level exclusion, but sanctions individual-level exclusion based on lan-
guage, culture and human capital. 
The nation state that relies on and enforces liberal norms and universalistic rules can legiti-
mately demand loyalty to the inside and autonomy and support to the outside. Paradoxically, 
this represents both a liberalization of citizenship law and a liberal cultural discrimination of 
immigrants at the lower end. Empirical research must consider the management of this ten-
sion, including how nation states incorporate universalistic norms, for example, through mar-
ketization at the upper end of the social status of the immigrants which then becomes the 
norm to create identity and difference. 
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